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1. Motivation 
 
Economic theorists have long been aware of the fact that in general equilibrium models with 
oligopolistic firms, equilibrium outcomes may depend on the choice of numeraire. When firms 
have the power to influence prices strategically, different price normalizations entail profit 
functions which are generally not monotone transformations of each other. Hence, under the 
assumption of profit maximization an arbitrary change in the price normalization rule amounts 
effectively to a change in the objective pursued by firms and profit-maximizing behaviour does 
not unambiguously serve shareholders’ interests (Gabszewicz and Vial, 1972, Dierker and 
Grodal, 1998).  
Despite Ginsburgh's (1994) provocative numerical example, applied general equilibrium analysts 
using models with imperfectly competitive firm conduct have largely ignored the price 
normalization problem.
1 In several recent contributions to the literature, applied policy modellers 
are explicitly criticized for their neglect to address the numeraire issue. Kletzer and Srinivasan 
(1999) argue that  
 
“ the dependence of equilibria on the choice of a numeraire is an important problem for theoretical models of 
international trade under imperfect competition and their empirical implementation. (...) Once it is 
established that equilibria are sensitive to the specification of the numeraire, it is a straightforward 
conclusion that estimates of the effects on welfare and resource allocation of changes in indirect or direct tax 
rates, tariff rates or quantitative restraints on international or national trade from computable general 
equilibrium models incorporating imperfect competition should be treated with suspicion. (...) The analyses 
of trade reforms using computable general equilibrium with monopolistically competitive or oligopolistic 
industries by Harris [1984], Cox and Harris [1985], de Melo and Roland-Holst [1991] and Devarajan and 
Rodrik [1991], among others, are all subject to the criticism that the results depend upon the arbitrary choice 
of price normalization made.”
2 
 
Dierker and Grodal (1998) likewise emphasize the potential relevance of the price normalization 
problem for practical policy analysis: 
 
“ Since imperfectly competitive markets abound in the real world, policy questions are often analyzed in 
models with strategically acting firms. However, the lack of a sound economic foundation for firms’ payoffs 
... often leads to confusion if such models are used as a basis for policy recommendations.”  
 
In a similar vein, Cordella (1998) suggests that  
 
“ far from being a theoretical curiosity, the normalization problem ... has far-reaching implications in applied 
models”.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to address the price normalization problem from an applied 
modelling perspective. It is shown that existing applied general equilibrium models with 
imperfect competition actually sidestep the numeraire dependency problem by imposing 
plausible restriction on firms’ perceptions of general equilibrium repercussions associated with 
their own strategic choices. In a literal sense the suggestion that the results of the studies cited 
above depend on arbitrary price normalization choices is technically invalid. A potentially valid 
                                                            
1 A recent exception is Hoffmann (2003). Burniaux and Waelbroeck (1993), Mercenier (1995), Kehoe and Prescott 
(1995) and Willenbockel (2004) mention the price normalisation problem en passant. 
2 References to working papers in the original text have been updated to refer to more accessible final published 
versions where appropriate.   3 
criticism is rather that oligopolists in these models do not act in full accordance with the 
rationality principle. It appears then reasonable to ask to which extent the quantitative predictions 
of a model with limited cognition actually deviate from the predictions of a corresponding model 
with complete cognition and fully rational behaviour. Common sense would seem to suggest that 
deviations are likely to remain negligible as long as the market shares of individual imperfectly 
competitive sectors in the economy remain small, as is indeed the case for modern economies 
with a diversified production and consumption structure.
3 
Since such casual appeals to common sense may be considered as too facile,
4 we compare the 
equilibria of a range of computable prototype models with and without full cognition of general 
equilibrium feedbacks in order to assess the quantitative relevance, or other, of the price 
normalisation problem under empirically plausible parameter choices. To develop a clear 
conception of the basic nature of the price normalisation issue, section 2 starts with a heuristic 
model of monopoly in general equilibrium while section 3 introduces oligopolistic interaction.   
 
 
2. The Price Normalisation Problem I: Monopoly in General Equilibrium 
 
Consider a closed economy which produces two consumption goods C1 and C2 using a single 
intersectorally mobile primary factor with linear production technologies. The economy is 
populated by numerous price-taking households with identical homothetic preferences 
represented by a CES utility function 
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s = C1 +C2, where L
s denotes the aggregate exogenous factor endowment, which is 
evenly spread across households.  Good 2 is produced by perfectly competitive firms so that p2 = 
w, where pi, iÎ{1,2}, and w denote output prices and factor price respectively. In contrast, good 
1 is supplied by a profit-maximizing monopolist. We assume initially that ownership titles to 
monopoly profits are evenly distributed. The demand function facing the monopolist is 
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3 See Ruffin (2003) and Neary (2003) for recent arguments along these lines. 
4 See e.g. Cornwall (1977): “Of course, it is not realistic to assume that firms actually recognize that their production 
choices influence the consumption possibilities which are feasible for the firms’ owners and that the firms 
consequently choose non-profit-maximizing plans. However, it is equally clear that it is not enough to say that there 
are a lot of firms in a real world economy and therefore the assumption of profit-maximizing behaviour gives a good 
approximization. This is not enough of a justification because it is not clear what or how profit maximization 
approximates. ... It may well be a kind of second best rule is to maximize profits. However, this has not been 
shown”.   4 
is the true price index dual to U and Y = wL
s￿￿￿Œ￿LV￿DJJUHJDWH￿KRXVHKROG￿LQFRPH￿LQFOXGLQJ￿
PRQRSRO\￿SURILWV￿Œ￿ ￿￿S1-w)C1. As long as the monopolist is assumed to neglect the indirect 
general equilibrium repercussions of variations in its own decision variable on p2, w and Y – i.e. 
as long as the firm is taken to act like a standard textbook partial equilibrium monopolist – no 
price normalization problem arises. In this case, subjectively optimal pricing behaviour is 
unambiguously characterised by the familiar Lerner condition 
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is the perceived elasticity of demand.  0￿LV￿KRPRJHQHRXV￿RI￿GHJUHH￿]HUR￿LQ￿SULFHV￿￿DQG￿WKH￿RSWLPDO￿
mark-up, and hence the general equilibrium of the two-sector economy, is independent of any 
price normalization rule a modeller may adopt to determine nominal variables. 
The situation changes once the assumption of limited cognition is dropped and the monopolist is 
assumed to recognise his influence on prices in other markets and thus on aggregate income via 
factor price and profit feedback effects. With full recognition of the profit feedback effect on C1 
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and the monopolist is aware that utility-maximising consumer behaviour in combination with the 
resource constraint entails that the relative price P = p1/p2 varies with the choice of monopoly 
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and that profit-maximizing behaviour in the competitive sector entails p2=w. Without a nominal 
anchor, the maximisation of nominal profits is now obviously an ill-defined problem. The choice 
of a numeraire, or more generally, a price normalisation rule is required before the optimal 
equilibrium mark-up can be characterised. Figure 1 shows the profit profile as a function of 
monopoly output described by (6) and (7) for the three normalisations p1=1, p2￿ Z￿ ￿￿￿DQG￿￿ ￿￿￿
thus measuring profits respectively in units of the monopoly good, in units of the competitive 
good (or in factor units), and in units of the consumption index U. Evidently the profit-
maximizing output level does not remain invariant to a change in the numeraire - the objective 
general equilibrium profit functions under different price normalizations are not monotone 
transformations of each other. E￿J￿￿￿WKH￿PD[LPLVDWLRQ￿RI￿SURILWV￿LQ￿WHUPV￿RI￿JRRG￿￿￿￿Œ
(2)) and in 
WHUPV￿RI￿JRRG￿￿￿￿Œ
(1)) are different objectives. Formally,  
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differs from the first-RUGHU￿FRQGLWLRQ￿IRU￿D￿PD[LPXP￿RI￿￿Œ




Figure 1:  
The Objective Profit Function under Alternative Normalizations 
 
 




The fact that the choice of price normalisation rule affects the equilibrium levels of real variables 
illustrated by this example is a generic feature of general equilibrium models with imperfectly 
competitive profit-maximising firms, given that these firms fully recognise their influence on the 
price system. Indeed Böhm (1994) and Grodal (1996) present oligopoly examples in which 
virtually every feasible production plan is an equilibrium for some normalisation rule. Other 
oligopoly examples in the literature demonstrate that an equilibium in pure strategies may exist 
for some price normalisation rules while other normalisations entail non-existence.
5 However, 
                                                            
5 See Dierker and Grodal (1986). Böhm (1994) shows that the price normalisation problem can even arise in pure 
exchange economies with utility-maximising price-setting agents and argues correspondingly that the assumption of 
profit maximisation is not essential for the occurence of the numeraire dependency result. See Rasmussen (1996) for  
further discussion of this point.   6 
here the goal of profit maximisation in combination with a normalisation rule that takes no 
account of firm owner’s actual interests will generally not be consistent with the aims of 
shareholders in the imperfectly competitive setting, and is thus not a rational objective. As 
Dierker and Grodal (1998) put it, “if price normalization rules and hence firms’ objectives fail to 
be based on economic considerations, only ill-founded, arbitrary conclusions can be drawn from 
such models”. In competitive Arrow-Debreu economies with production, in which no agent can 
influence the price system strategically, on the other hand, the goal of profit maximisation is 
unambiguously in the interest of shareholders irrespective of the choice of price normalisation. 
The present example serves to elaborate the point. Maintaining the assumption of an even spread 
of monopoly shares for a moment, it is immediately evident that the goal of monopoly profit 
maximisation is irrational or indeed schizophrenic under any normalisation rule. With full 
recognition of his control over the price system via (7), the monopolist as agent of shareholders 
is in effect in the position of an omniscient central planner and should mimic the perfectly 
competitive outcome by setting P equal to the marginal rate of transformation (MRT=1) in order 
to maximise shareholder welfare. The optimum is of course associated with zero profits under 
any normalisation. The selection of a relative price P>MRT along the general equilibrium price 
schedule (7) would generate positive profit income but would at the same reduce the purchasing 
power of factor income in terms of good 1 and entail a net welfare loss. In other words, the 
maximisation of  “producer surplus” without regard to the consequences for shareholders’ 
“consumer surplus” is generally not in the interest of firm owners. The example may appear 
trivial, since as a matter of course there is no room for strategic behaviour in what is effectively a 
single-representative-agent framework. Yet the key message that a rational, not self-defeating 
strategy for an imperfect competitor must take shareholders’ preferences and endowments into 
account, as highlighted by this extreme example, carries over to settings with real scope for 
strategic behaviour. 
Thus let us introduce income heterogeneity by decomposing the household sector into a 
monopoly shareholder group with income Ys=wLs￿Œ￿DQG￿D￿QRQ-shareholder group with income 
Yn=wLn. Both household types have identical CES preferences as before, so that the aggregate 
demand function for the monopoly good (2) and the general equilibrium price schedule (7) still 
apply. The rational objective of the monopolist is to maximise 
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Since the indirect utility function on the RHS of (10) is homogeneous of degree zero in its 
arguments, the optimal supply strategy is independent of the choice of price normalization. 
Without loss of generality, we can normaliVH￿WKH￿WUXH￿FRQVXPHU￿SULFH￿LQGH[￿￿￿DW￿XQLW\￿￿7KXV￿WKH￿
rational objective of the monopolist can equivalently be expressed as maximisation of 
shareholders’ total real income (in units of the consumption index), 
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Note that Ys, which can be expressed as a function of C1 by using (7) in (11) – is synonymous 
ZLWK￿WKH￿JHQHUDO￿HTXLOLEULXP￿SURILW￿IXQFWLRQ￿￿￿￿￿IRU￿WKH￿QRUPDOLVDWLRQ￿￿ ￿￿LQ￿)LJXUH￿￿￿LI￿/s=0. 
Thus only if shareholders' only income source is monopoly dividends, is the maximisation of   7 
SURILWV￿LQ￿FRPELQDWLRQ￿ZLWK￿WKH￿VSHFLILF￿FODVV￿RI￿QRUPDOLVDWLRQ￿UXOHV￿￿ FRQVWDQW!￿￿D￿IXOO\￿UDWLRQDO￿
objective, i.e. an objective that is in complete agreement with the interests of shareholders.
6 
Profit maximisation together with a specific normalisation rule - namely p2=1 - would also be 
totally consistent with shareholder preferences if these preferences take the form Us=u(C2
s), u'>0, 
so that shareholders don't consume the output of their own firm.
7  
This extreme case suggests the conjecture, that the practical relevance of the numeraire problem 
may be negligible if the share of monopoly output in agents' total consumer expenditure is 
sufficiently small. But how small is sufficiently small? Table 1 provides a tentative answer.  
The Table compares the general equilibria of the two-sector model when the monopolist has 
respectively limited and full cognition of the equilibrium consequences of his price-setting 
EHKDYLRXU￿ IRU￿ DOWHUQDWLYH￿ YDOXHV￿ RI￿ WKH￿ SUHIHUHQFH￿ LQWHQVLW\￿ SDUDPHWHU￿ /￿￿ ZKLFK￿ JRYHUQV￿ Whe 
market share of the monopolistic sector in total consumer expenditure. In the limited cognition 
model, the monopoly mark-up is determined in partial-analytical fashion via (4) and (5), i.e. the 
monopolist ignores his influence on Y and pays no attention to the true interests of shareholders 
as consumers in his price setting decision. Not surprisingly, when the monopoly sector is small 
in the economy, the actual general equilibrium income feedback effect is indeed negligible, so 
that the limited cognition model provides an almost perfect approximation of the equilibrium 
with an omniscient rational monopolist. More interestingly, the deviation remains moderate even 




Table 1: Deviations of Limited Cognition Model from Full Cognition Monopoly Model 
 















0.1  0.6  0.6  +0.3  -0.0  -0.00 
0.2  3.0  3.0  +1.5  -3.2  -0.00 
0.3  8.4  8.1  +4.2  -8.0  -0.06 
0.4  18.1  16.8  +9.1  -14.6  -1.45 
0.5  32.7  29.3  +17.3  -23.4  -4.43 
0.6  50.9  44.5  +29.8  -31.5  -10.13 
0.7  69.5  60.6  +48.0  -38.9  -18.36 
0.8  84.7  75.7  +77.7  -42.4  -27.97 
0.9  95.1  89.0  +138.4  -45.7  -38.06 
0RGHO￿SDUDPHWHU￿YDOXHV￿￿1 ￿￿￿/s=0, Ln=10. 
 
 
                                                            
6 However, once preference heterogeneity among shareholders is introduced, the very notion of shareholders’ 
preferences becomes an elusive concept due to Arrow’s impossibility theorem. See however Dierker and Grodal 
(1998,1999)’s approach to the formulation of a rational firm objective in the presence of heterogeneous 
shareholders. A separate literature analyses shareholder voting equilibria – see Yalcin and Renstrom (2003) for 
further reference. 
7 The island model of Hart (1985) can be seen as an extension of this observation to a multi-sector multi-agent 
setting.   8 
Table 1 may be seen to provide a first indication of the practical irrelevance of the price 
normalisation problem for quantitative policy analysis. However, since imperfectly competitive 
sectors in computable general equilibrium models are typically oligopolies rather than 




3. The Price Normalisation Problem II: Oligopoly in General Equilibrium 
 
We now assume that sector 1 is populated by n symmetric firms and characterised by horizontal 
product differentiation a la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Consumer preferences over the composite 
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the demand function facing an individual oligopolist takes the form 
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where p is the price of an individual variety and 
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is the consistent price index dual to C1. On the production side, we maintain the assumption of 
linear single-factor technologies but add a recurrent fixed factor requirement per firm in sector 1 
to introduce increasing returns to scale. This setting is a stylised two-sector closed-economy 
version of typical multi-sectoral open-economy computable general equilibrium models as 
employed in the studies cited by Kletzer and Srinivasan (1999) above.
8 
Supply behaviour in sector 1 depends on the assumed form of strategic interaction among firms. 
Most applied studies assume either Bertrand or Cournot competition and the individual firm 
perceives to have no influence on Y, factor prices and prices in other sectors. Under Bertrand 
competition, the perceived elasticity of demand, which determines the equilibrium mark-up via 
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while Cournot competition entails 
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In both cases the equilibrium mark-up is independent of the choice of price normalisation. In 
order to determine firm behaviour under full cognition of general equilibrium feedbacks, the 
price normalisation problem re-appears, since the elasticity of Y with respect to p is 
indeterminate without a normalisation rule. In analogy to the previous section, the appropriate 
normalisation rule is to normalise the true consumer price index 



















         (17) 
 
at unity (or any positive scalar constant), provided that shareholders of any firm receive only 
profit income and do not hold shares of other firms. The price elasticity of xs with full cognition 
of general equilibrium feedbacks including factor price effects, which governs the Nash 
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in the Cournot-1DVK￿FDVH￿￿1RWH￿WKDW￿WKH￿WHUP￿￿.1/n –wx/Y) equals the equilibrium share of an 
individual firm’s operating profit in GDP, (p-Z￿[￿<￿￿,Q￿WKH￿OLPLW￿IRU￿.1:￿￿WKLV￿WHUP￿YDQLVKHV￿￿L￿H￿￿
for a decreasing market share of the oligopolistic sector in the economy the elasticity under full 
cognition converges to the limited cognition elasticity (15) or (16). Thus, as long as the GDP 
share of an individual oligopolistic industry within an applied general equilibrium model remains 
sufficiently small, the ‘error’ incurred by neglecting general equilibrium feedbacks will remain 
negligible.  
 
How small is ‘sufficiently small’? Figure 2 plots the percentage deviation of equilibrium 
aggregate welfare and firm output levels between the limited and complete cognition models for 
varying market shares of an individual oligopolistic sector in the economy. For empirically 
relevant ranges of the relative size of an individual oligopolistic sector producing similar 
products within the economy as a whole, the limited cognition equilibria are almost perfect 
approximations of the corresponding equilibria with fully rational oligopolists. More 
                                                            
9 d’Aspremont et al. (1996) derive the corresponding perceived elasticity expression for the normalization w=1 but 
do not address the dependency of the result on this particular numeraire choice.   10 
interestingly, the deviations remain moderate even for empirically unlikely .2 values. The tenor 
of Figure 2 is robust to parameter variations, and the argument carries over to large-scale 
multisectoral models with multiple oligopolistic industries, which together may comprise a large 
fraction of the economy, as long as each individual industry is small in relation to aggregate 
income. 
   11 
Figure 2:  
 
Equilibrium Deviations of Limited Cognition from Full Cognition Model  
 
(a) Deviation of aggregate welfare level 
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4. Conclusion 
 
As long as imperfectly competitive firms are large in their own markets but small in the economy 
– as is typically the case for modern diversified economies – the so-called price normalization 
problem appears to be of negligible quantitative relevance for applied policy analysis. The 
suggestion that the results of typical applied general equilibrium models are contingent on 
arbitrary numeraire choices is invalid. Rather, these models bypass the issue by assuming that 
oligopolists have limited cognition of general equilibrium feedback effects and do not act in full 
accordance with shareholder objectives. However, simulations of a range of prototype models 
with shareholder homogeneity suggest, that for empirically relevant firm market share ranges the 
limited cognition approach generates close approximations to the corresponding equilibria with 
full rationality and perfect cognition.   13 
Technical Appendix 
 
The general equilibrium demand elasticity for a Bertrand oligopolist: 
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The Bertrand assumption entails the perceptions dlnP1=dlnpi/n and dlnx-i ￿1-0B)dlnpi. 
Differentiation of Y=wL+pixi-w(xi+F)+(n-1)( p-ix-i-w(x-i+F) in combination with the aggregate 
resource constraint C1=L-￿s(xs+F) yields 
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Using (A-2) and (A-3) in (A-1) yields (18a). 
 
The general equilibrium demand elasticity for a Cournot oligopolist: 
 
Log-differentiation of the inverse demand function pi .[i
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Using (A-5) and (A-6) in (A-4) yields (18b).   14 
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